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THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT
Robert C. Ellickson*
In my most provocative remark this afternoon, I will assert that the
focus of this symposium is inconsistent with the ideals of the Federalist
Society. In setting up this event, I will say, the Federalist Society (of all
organizations!) has fallen prey to the Beltway Syndrome. Because this may
turn out to be my only provocative remark, I will wait until the end of my talk
to explain it. In the interim I will discuss the important, if less flashy, issue
of privatization, that is, the turning over to the private sector functions that
governments might, and often have performed,
The merits of privatization vary by context, and are a major topic in
themselves. I will leave the merits of the debate to experts in public finance
and organizational behavior. Because this is a conference commemorating the
United States Constitution, I will instead devote the brief time alloted to a
legal discussion, mostly of the possible constitutional constraints on how
elected officials might choose to allocate functions between the public and
private sectors. Most of my remarks will involve, as they say around the
Quadrangle Club at the University of Chicago, strictly positive analysis. That
is, I will describe constitutional law as it is, not as I would necessarily like it
tobe.
Mention of some political personalities will help give body to the
constitutional issues that I will touch upon. Think of someone who would
like to socialize far more of the American economy; think, perhaps, of
Michael Harrington, the nation's leading socialist, or of Gerry Frug, the
Critical Legal Scholar at Harvard who has urged cities to operate banks and
insurance companies.' Would any provision of the federal Constitution, or
perhaps a state constitution, prevent them from accomplishing their goals?
Conversely, I think of someone who would like to move sharply in the
opposite direction, who would privatize prisons, streets, and other traditional
governmental functions; think of Stuart Butler of the Heritage Foundation, or
Robert Poole, Jr., the editor of Reason. Would any constitutional provisions
frustrate their pursuit of a privatization agenda?
* Robert E. Paradise Professor in Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School.
1. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1128, 1150-51 (1980).
HeinOnline  -- 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 157 1988-1989
GEO. MASON U.L. REV.
The United States could conceivably have a constitution that would
enact the social statics of a particular theorist who had a well-developed view
of the proper role of the state. If that theorist were James Buchanan or Robert
Nozick, the constitution would severely limit the role of the public sector. If
the theorist were Sidney Webb or Oscar Lange, the constitution would man-
date that many services be publicly produced. By extension, a constitution in-
spired by the ideas of Richard Musgrave, Paul Samuelson, or James Tobin,
would mandate maintenance of some particular "mixed" economy.
My general thesis, which most of you will find indisputable, is that our
constitutional arrangements, both as written and as interpreted, are not of a
confining character. Our constitutions give elected officials enormous scope
within which to alter the mix of the public and private sectors. As a result, the
allocation of functions in the American economy is largely determined by
electoral politics, not the content of hard-to-amend constitutional text.
I. CONsTrnuTIONAL BARRIERS TO SOCIALISM
I will discuss the possibility of constitutional obstacles to a Michael
Harrington or a Gerry Frug achieving his dream of a more "public" econ-
omy. These obstacles might arise in either of two ways: first, in constitu-
tional provisions that restrict governmental powers, and second, in provi-
sions that create individual freedoms whose protection by force would make
government enterprise impossible.
I invite you to scan the United States Constitution to find specific lan-
guage that bars the United States, or a state or local government, from enter-
ing into the production of a particular good or service. There are, in fact, a
few such provisions. This shows that, when the framers had a mind to, they
knew how expressly to deny powers to governments. The most obvious of
these provisions is the clause in the first amendment that denies Congress the
power to establish a religion. That enterprise - religion - is one that
government cannot undertake. As Richard Willard has reminded me, there
are a few other constitutional restrictions of this sort, mostly obscure ones
that appear late in article I. For example, the Constitution denies both the
federal government and the state governments the power to confer a title of
nobility,2 and forbids the states from coining money.3 One would look in
vain, however, to find anything like a general "free-enterprise" clause
forbidding governments from assuming productive functions traditionally
carried out in the private sector.
2. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9-10.
3. Id. at § 10.
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A critic might assert, however, that the framers saw no need to ex-
pressly deny governmental powers because they intended to restrict Congress
to powers expressly granted it, principally those mentioned in article I,
section 8. Had the Supreme Court construed express federal powers
narrowly, it would indeed have greatly restricted the scope of federal
(although not state) enterprise. To Richard Epstein's dismay, I am sure, the
Court has never strictly policed the list in article I, section 8. Moreover, the
Court's deference to Congress' interpretation of federal powers is not some
recent mischief of the Warren Court, but dates back to the Marshall Court's
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,4 which sustained Congress's power to
charter the Bank of the United States, a federal undertaking arguably
unauthorized by article I.
I have no special competence to enter into a debate over the propriety of
a decision such as McCulloch. I simply offer the observation that it is now
bedrock constitutional law that the Court is inclined to defer to Congress's
definition of the scope of federal powers. Since Justice McReynolds's lone
dissent in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,' no Justice has argued
otherwise. Justice Black's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case nicely illustrates
the point. Although Justice Black held that President Truman lacked the
power unilaterally to take over the steel mills, he asserted in dicta that it was
"beyond question" that Congress would have had that power had it wanted to
exercise it.6 In short, if Michael Harrington were to succeed in pushing
through legislation designed to socialize the steel industry, it is virtually in-
conceivable that the Supreme Court would hold that program to be beyond
the power of the United States.
7
The Constitution of course speaks not only of powers, but also of
rights. This symposium is largely about economic liberties. Would one of the
constitutional clauses that protect those sorts of rights stand as a bulwark
against socialization of the economy? As a positive matter, I predict that
these clauses are but a flimsy picket line that socialists could easily overrun.
The public use clause of the fifth amendment could conceivably be construed
to bar a Michael Harrington program to condemn the steel mills, but the
unanimous Midkiff decision8 is a recent reminder that the Supreme Court is
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. 297 U.S. 288, 356 (1936).
6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
7. The Court's only recent decision that refused to defer to a congressional definition of
federal power is National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Interestingly, the
Court there acted to protect not the private sector, but rather the states, from the reach of federal
power. Even this proved to be shortlived, as Usery was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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likely to defer to legislative choices in the use of eminent domain powers.
The contracts clause and the takings clause, as Frank Easterbrook explained
this morning, basically only constrain governments from retrospective
rearrangements of rights, not from prospective enterprises. Like the public
use clause, these clauses cannot conceivably be construed to prevent a
government from establishing and building an enterprise by means of
consensual transactions. Because these clauses at most limit coercive
takeovers, not friendly ones, they are not a staunch defense against socialist
programs. For example, if the corporations and ESOPs (employee stock
option plans) that currently own the steel mills would not object to being
acquired by the national government, these clauses would not even come into
play.
Would that workhorse of the Constitution, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, empower an opponent of socialism to torpedo legisla-
tion setting up a state enterprise? Even during the Lochner era the Supreme
Court held otherwise.9 In a little-known case, Green v. Frazier0 the Court
unanimously rejected a substantive due process challenge to a North Dakota
statute that authorized the establishment of state banks, state grain elevators,
and other state enterprises.
What about state constitutions? Do they contain provisions that would
inhibit the establishment of state enterprises? In some ways, the states are
even less restricted than the federal government. In general, the states have
plenary powers, not limited powers. As remnants of Prairie Socialism of the
Progressive Era, North Dakota runs a bank and Wisconsin offers life insur-
ance; neither state's constitution explicitly authorizes its activity." Many
states do have constitutional provisions that have been interpreted to limit to
"public purposes" the spending of state and municipal revenues from taxes
and bond issues. These provisions do prompt litigation, some of it friendly
actions by bond counsel. As anyone who follows the latest government ven-
tures in building stadiums and convention centers knows, however, these
clauses currently are not major inhibitions on government entrepreneurship."
In sum, Michael Harrington and Gerry Frug can take heart. Little in ei-
ther the United States Constitution or the state constitutions stand in their
way.
9. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. 253 U.S. 233 (1920). See also Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917)
(Maine statute that empowered cities to sell heating fuels did not deprive taxpayers of due
process of law).
11. See N.D. Cent. Code § 6-09 (1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 607.02-.22 (West 1980 &
1987 Supp.).
12. See generally Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1519, 1568-73 (1982).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON PRIVATIZATION
Stuart Butler and Robert Poole can also take heart. The legal situation is
basically symmetrical. Courts would be unlikely to find constitutional imped-
iments to a wide-reaching program of privatization.
The courts have construed some constitutional clauses as mandating
governmental provision of certain services. Functions that are inherently
"legislative," for example, cannot be delegated to private decision-makers.' 3
Because article II identifies the President as commander in chief, the federal
government could not delegate the conduct of a war entirely to the
Pinkertons. A statute that farmed out the conduct of criminal trials from
courts to contractors would likely fall for improperly delegating judicial
functions.
Nevertheless, the United States Constitution generally lists powers that
the federal government may exercise, not that it must exercise. Article I,
section 8, simply states that "Congress shall have Power to ... establish
Post Offices .... raise and support Armies," and so on, not that Congress
has to perform these functions.
Interestingly, state constitutions are more likely to require the public
provision of important services, in particular, "common schools."' 4 A clause
of this sort might mistakenly be construed to require government production,
as opposed to government provision,5 of basic education, an interpretation
that would jeopardize experiments with school vouchers. As another exam-
ple, the California Constitution prevents the alienation of public tidelands; as
a constitutional matter, these lands are forever socialized.' 6 As with the
federal Constitution, however, these sorts of clauses are exceptional in state
constitutions.
In some contexts courts would hold that programs privatizing formerly
governmental functions would have to be structured so as not to violate
constitutional clauses that recognize individual rights. Recently there have
been experiments with the hiring of contractors to operate prisons. Those
who analyzed these programs from a constitutional perspective usually
assume that prison functions are in principle delegable, but caution that
13. A leading case supporting this amorphous proposition is Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to trade
associations).
14. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5.
15. On this distinction, see R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and
Practice 8-9 (2d ed. 1976).
16. Cal. Const. art. XV, § 3.
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private prisons must meet constitutional standards, for example, the eighth
amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. 7
This example illustrates the centrality of the state-action issue to the
privatization debate. Suppose the decisions of homeowner associations, for
example, would be regarded as state action. That holding would reduce the
momentousness of privatizing, say, the function of architectural review from
municipalities to homeowner associations because that switch would not
much affect the legal climate surrounding the review process.
In short, in a few contexts there are constitutional barriers to the
achievement of privatization, and in considerably more contexts there are
constitutional restrictions on the terms of privatization. Nevertheless, like
Michael Harrington, Stuart Butler's chief obstacle is electoral politics, not
constitutional doctrine.
III. SYSTEMIC BIASES IN FAVOR OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
Because the constitutions provide legislators with such a broad policy
space, those of us who are interested in more experiments with privatization
should pay more attention to the biases toward socialization that exist in non-
constitutional parts of the legal structure."l Government tax and spending
programs often discriminate against private firms. Internal Revenue Code
provisions are perhaps the most important of these. Cities currently build
sports stadiums in large part because, unlike private corporations, they can
finance these with bonds whose interest is exempt from federal income taxa-
tion. Because a homeowner who itemizes deductions can deduct municipal
taxes but not homeowner association dues, there is a tax bias favoring public
provision of local public goods.
Government spending programs tend to exhibit a similiar bias in favor
of public provision. For example, as proponents of school vouchers point
out, state spending in support of primary and secondary education is heavily
biased in favor of public schools. Similarily, a public university, such as the
University of California, receives deep public subsidies, while a private uni-
versity, such as Stanford, which offers much the same service, receives
markedly shallower government support.
17. Note, The Panopticon Revisted: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 Yale
L.J. 353 (1986).
18. See generally Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1519, 1573-79 (1982).
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IV. THE PRIVATIZATION OF RULEMAKING
Before coming to my punchline, I would like to suggest how privatiza-
tion can proceed beyond what is sometimes imagined. Even skeptics of gov-
ernment competence commonly assert that government has a central, perhaps
even an exclusive, role in the establishment of property rights. For example,
Robert Nozick and Ronald Coase have both implied that it is up to the state to
define the entitlements that one person has against another. 9 Once the state
had carried out this basic function, these authors would mostly rely on con-
sensual transaction to effect further adjustments.
This legal-centralist view, although common, is false as an empirical
matter. In fact, the state does not have a monopoly in the creation and
enforcement of entitlements. 0 A timely illustration is how players of pickup
games arrange entitlements to use basketball courts. Without state assistance,
players develop informal customs that establish exclusive temporary property
rights to use courts, thereby preventing the potential tragedy of court
congestion during games. Typical basketball norms limit games to a
particular number of baskets, entitle only the winning team to play a second
game, and set procedures for the selection of their opponents. That these
rules are informally created does not detract from their bindingness. Anyone
considering violating these norms could anticipate becoming the target of
self-help remedies, ranging from negative gossip to mild forms of violent
retaliation.
The ultimate in privatization is thus the privatization of rulemaking. In
some contexts, of which bastketball courts may be one, there may be reason
to think that private rulemaking will outperform government rulemaking.
Advocates of privatization should therefore encourage the legal system to
adopt the private systems of property rights that emerge in these contexts.
There is plenty of precedent for this. For example, the Uniform Commercial
Code tends to rely on merchant practices as a source of law.
V. How THE FEDERALISTS HAVE SUCCUMBED TO THE BELTWAY SYNDROME
I have now reached my final point, which I advertised as my most
provocative. The "Beltway Syndrome," as you know, is the propensity of
those who live in and around Washington, D.C. to exaggerate the importance
of the federal government to people who live beyond the Beltway. Perhaps
19. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. Law & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).
20. See generally Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social
Control, 16 J. Legal Stud. 67, 81-90 (1987).
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because the Federalist Society is headquartered in Washington, it seems to
have fallen prey to this disease.
Take a look at the program for this symposium. It refers in numerous
places to "the Constitution." I emphasize the word "the." As I have re-
minded you in various parts of my remarks, we have many, not just one,
constitutions in this country. Each of the fifty states has a constitution (and
some municipalities also have charters whose provisions may restrain
government enterprise). A discussion of "Constitutional Protections of
Economic Liberty" should not proceed as if only federal constitutional rules
mattered.2 The Federalist Society, if it were true to its name, should be
especially interested in promoting the development of diverse state (and local)
constitutional regimes. If states were to compete along this dimension, citizen
preferences about various constitutional regimes would be revealed to some
degree by how migrating firms and households "voted with their feet" among
states.22 Suppose, for example, that the New Hampshire Constitution were
to stress welfare rights. Most members of the Federalist Society, I suspect,
would predict that working class families would prefer the New Hampshire
legal regime. If this prediction were to be correct, and if one can assume that
states desire to attract residents, then state competiton in the drafting and
interpretation of their constitutions might prove to be a powerful force for the
protection of economic liberties.
Lawyers, judges, and law schools have all paid far too little attention to
state constitutional texts. There have been scores of articles on federal takings
law, for example, but almost none about how the takings clauses in state
constitutions should be interpreted. As another example, the constitutions of
many states start with a section that recognizes a person's "inalienable right"
to engage in "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." 23 Perhaps this
symposium should have included a session on the interpretation of this lan-
guage.
Groups committed to the decentralization of power should help nurture
and publicize differences in sub-federal legal regimes. As a penance for
falling prey to the Beltway Syndrome on this occasion, I recommend that the
Federalist Society select for a future conference this topic: Taking State
Constitutions Seriously.
24
21. Of the participants here, I credit Frank Easterbrook and Craig Stubblebine in
particular for recognizing this point.
22. See Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 127 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Cal Const. art I, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. I, § 2.
24. This topic would be a variation on the theme of the Federalist Society's first national
event, a Symposium on Federalism, whose proceedings appear in 6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1
(1982).
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